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The comment published by Ruth Allen on pretrial publicity began as an advanced legal research paper under
my supervision. This is a particularly timely piece in light of the 0.1. Simpson murder trial, which may provide
the single best forum ever for examining the issues presented by this comment. Ms. Allen begins her examination
of the topic by taking her reader back to Sheppardv. Maxwell, the "0.1. Simpson case" of its day, and the first
opportunity for the Supreme Court to thoroughly address the constitutional implications ofpretrial publicity. Ms.
Allen carefully analyzes the overlapping and frequently conflicting constitutional and policy considerations among
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, particularly
as the later relates to the presumption ofinnocence, when weighed against the First Amendment rights ofthe press
and the public. She does a superb job of reflecting the balance among these rights and examining the methods
available to insure that the First Amendment rights can be honored, while in no way detracting from the defendant's
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The remedies Ms. Allen discusses in her commentary are restraining
orders and disciplinary rules. She shows her reader how to apply her analysis to any current" crime ofthe century."
Professor Byron L. Warnken

Pre-Trial Publicity: Can There Be A Fair Trial When
The Press And The Prosecutor Join Hands?

Ruth G. Allen

"Murder and mystery , society, sex and suspense
were combined in such a manner as to intrigue and
captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps
unparalleled in recent annals. Throughout the
preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal
skirmishes and the nine week trial, circulation conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the
American public in the bizarre. .. In this atmosphere of a 'Roman Holiday' for the news media,
Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life."!

Sam Sheppard was convicted in 1954 for the bludgeoning death of his wife. During the entire pre-trial
period, "virulent and incriminating publicity about
Sheppard and the murder made the case notorious."2
Before the jury began deliberations they were
not sequestered and had access to all news media
though the court made "suggestions" and "requests" that the jurors not expose themselves to
comment about the case ••• Pervasive publicity was

About the Author: Ruth Allen is in her final semester at the University of Baltimore School of Law and is a member of
the Law Forom staff. She is presently employed as a judicial law clerk for the Honorable Paul A. Smith on the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City. The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and support of Professor Byron L. Warnken
throughout her enrollment at the University of Baltimore School of Law.

prosecutors or defenders, who use the press to obtain
as partial a jury as possible, courts should respond. 8
Few courts, however, are willing to challenge the
protection of the First Amendment and restrain trial
participants as a remedy to minimize the effects of
Sheppard's conviction was upheld on appeal, and prejudicial pre-trial publicity. Consequently, they focus
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 4 He on reducing the prejudicial effect by relying on lesser
filed a writ of habeas corpus and ultimately, the Su- measures to protect the rights of an accused to a fair and
preme Court granted certiorari and held that Sheppard impartial trial.
Voir dire is a remedy frequently used by the courts
did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The even when the case has been saturated with pre-trial
court's decision was based on the trial judge's failure to publicity. 9 InMu 'Min v. Virginia, \0 the Supreme Court
fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently held that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
prejudicial publicity, which satuand the Fourteenth Amendrated the community, and his
ment right to due process
failure to control the disruptive
do not require that prospecInside the courtroom,
influences in the courtroom. 5 The
tive jurors be questioned
there are procedural
Court remanded the case to the
regarding the specific nasafeguards
to
restrict
the
district court with instructions to
ture of the pre-trial publicprosecutor
and
protect
issue the writ and release
ity surrounding the case for
Sheppard from custody.6
which
they are being sethe accused Outside
lected. The fair trial right is
It can be argued that Sam
the courtroom, however,
Sheppard would have been connot implicated merely bea lawyer's comments
victed in spite of the deluge of
cause jurors have been exmay be protected by the
sensational news reporting beposed to publicity; rather,
First
Amendment
fore his indictment and during
the standard is whether "the
his trial. However, the fair trial
jurors had such fixed opinright is violated when potential
ions that they could not
jurors are allowed open access
judge impartially the guilt
to inflammatory information
or innocence of the defenabout the accused, when the media reports incriminat- dant."11 The existence of bias is irrelevant, as long as
ing allegations not entered into evidence, and when the the jurors' opinions are not so fixed that they cannot put
press disrupts a trial in progress to the extent that the bias aside and judge the guilt or innocence of the
defense is irreparably damaged. 7 While this setting may defendant impartially.12
appear extreme, it is arguable that such sensationalism
Today, communities are often inundated with sencould exist today in a court oflaw.
sational news reporting. Often, prosecutors zealously
One need only reflect upon the extensive pre-trial pursue high profile suspects with an eye toward publicpublicity surrounding the O.J. Simpson case to confirm ity. In fact, it might prove impossible to bring certain
that such media events occur forty years after Sheppard cases to trial without some imposition on the fair trial
v. Maxwell. Today, the media impact is more pervasive rights of the accused. Consequently, restraint of the
and more likely to reach and influence an overwhelming trial participants may arguably be the only effective
number ofpotential jurors. As a result, the court is faced measure in preventing prejudice to the criminal defenwith a delicate but highly important balancing act dant.
between the fair trial rights of the accused and the
The Sixth Amendment ensures a criminal defendant
public's right to be informed of what transpires inside the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury
the courtroom. The Supreme Court has cautioned that of the state and district where the crime was committhis sort of delicate balancing should be undertaken ted. 13 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
reluctantly; but when provoked by attorneys, whether Amendment requires an impartial judge. 14 Along with

given to the case throughout the trial, much of it
involving incriminating matter not introduced at
trial .•. At least some ofthe publicity deluge reached
the jurors.3
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the rights of the accused is the public's right to be
informed ofwhat transpires in the court system in order
to judge whether the system ofcriminal justice is fair and
right. 15 The judiciary has the responsibility of protecting the due process rights of the accused while maintaining the interests of society. 16 Yet in recent years, it
has become increasingly evident that the due process
rights ofthe accused have been seriously threatened by
dramatic and prejudicial publicity.17
In a highly publicized trial, saturation ofthe community with news about the case can be a factor in
determining whether the publicity might prevent a fair
trial. 18 Excessive publicity may interfere with the due
process requirement that the burden of proof with
respect to each element of the crime, must be borne by
the prosecution.1 9 When pre-trial publicity shifts the
burden to the defendant by reducing the possibility of
obtaining an untainted jury and requiring him to overcome the effects of prejudicial and sometimes erroneous publicity, the community is denied its opportunity
to participate in the judicial process, and the accused is
denied his right to a fair trial.
In many cases, the prosecutor is the best source of
extrajudicial statements. 20 He is viewed as the most
informed party to the case, and he interacts with law
enforcement personnel, judges, court employees, defense counsel, and interested citizens. 21 More importantly, he has access to the government's evidence.
Inside the courtroom, there are procedural safeguards
to restrict the prosecutor and protect the accused. 22
Outside the courtroom, however, a lawyer's comments
may be protected by the First Amendment.
Usually, the prosecutor's primary purpose for
making a statement to the press about a pending indictment or an ongoing trial in a criminal action is to inform
the public. Too frequently, however, this is not the only
reason for releasing information to the press. The
prosecutor's objective may be an attempt to enhance his
public image or status in the community with an eye
toward employment in the private sector or future
political considerations. 23 More likely, the purpose for
releasing incriminating statements to the press is to
increase the probability of indictment or conviction of
the accused at trial by influencing future grand jurors
and trial jurors. 24
Similarly, there is an incentive for the prosecutor to
gain an advantage over the defendant in any plea
bargaining negotiations. A prosecutor has more lever;?,~
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age during plea negotiations if the defendant fears that
he will be unable to obtain an impartial jury as a result
of pre-trial publicity. To have the prosecutor feed the
press evidence in anticipation of a trial is to make the
state itself, through the prosecutor, a conscious participant in trial by newspaper.25
The prosecutor represents a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all, and whose interest in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done.26 The prosecutor as a
representative for the state has a duty to protect the
interest of both the accused and the state. The twofold
aim ofwhich is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence
suffer. 27
Protecting the integrity of the adversarial criminal
litigation process from external influences is a state
concern parallel to, but independent of, the interest in
protecting the individual rights of the accused. 28 While
statements from both prosecutor and defense counsel
can affect this interest,29 the prevailing view is that the
statements ofthe prosecutor are more likely to influence
jurors,30 and that prosecutors may more readily violate
the "no comment" rules. 31
Pre-trial publicity may be challenged as interfering
with the presumption of innocence that characterizes
the criminal justice system. The theory of the criminal
justice system is that the decisions to be reached are to
be adduced only by evidence and argument in open
court, and not by external influences, whether private
talk or public print. 32 The primary characteristic of the
system is the constitutional requirement that the prosecution establish the defendant's guilt by proofbeyond
a reasonable doubt. 33
The presumption of innocence thus refers to a
burden of proof, and not a determination by the justice
system that the accused is either guilty or innocent. It
has been defined as "that bedrock 'axiomatic and
elementary' principle whose enforcement lies at the
foundation ofthe administration of our criminallaw;"34
a basic component of a fair trial under our criminal
justice system;35 an assumption that in the absence of
facts to the contrary, assumes that a person's conduct
was lawful. 36
Both the presumption of innocence instruction and
the beyond a reasonable doubt instruction must be given
to the jury. 37 In Taylorv. Kentucky,38 the Supreme Court
raised the presumption of innocence jury instruction to

a constitutional dimension when it held that a criminal speech is to shield the factfinder from influences other
defendant's right to a fair trial was violated under the than evidence and argument presented in the courtdue process guarantee offundamental fairness whenev- room.44 Lawyers cannot communicate with jurors
er the trial judge failed to give a requested presumption outside the courtroom either before or during trial; they
of innocence jury instruction. 39
should not be able to champion their case publicly
The majority opinion in Tay/or asserted in dicta that through extrajudicial comments which might influence
the primary function of the presumption of innocence prospective jurors either directly or through the resultconcept is to serve as a warning to lay jurors. While the ing public opinion. 45
legal scholar may understand that the presumption of
The counter argument to restricting an attorney's
innocence and the prosecutor's burden of proof are speech is that the prosecutor does not lose his right of
logically similar, the ordinary citizen may well draw free speech when he becomes an attorney. Those who
significant additional guidance from the presumption of espouse this view rely on the fact that the prosecutor is
innocence instruction. 4O The
publicly accountable,46 and
Court emphasized that this inthe public has a First
Tile Model Rules and tile
struction serves a "special purAmendment right to judiDisciplinary
Rules
are
in
pose" beyond that covered by a
cial proceedings. 47 Consereasonable doubt instruction, "in
place because tile legal
quently, the same standard
that it cautions the jury to conthat applies to both press
community saw a need to
sciously eliminate from their
and public should apply to
police itself. As a result,
minds all the suspicion that aristhe prosecutor.
restrictions which do not
es from the arrest, indictment,
The Supreme Court has
apply
to
either
the
public
or
and the arraignment, and to reach
held that a state must find a
tile press are enforceable
their conclusions solely from the
clear and present danger of
legal evidence introduced at triagainst officers of the court
actual prejUdice or immial."41 Standing alone, the prenent threat before it may
sumption of innocence instruclimit the press's right to
tion is an inadequate safeguard against exposure to publish reports about pending judicial proceedings.48
extensive pre-trial publicity. The "special purpose" However, in Gentile v. State Bar a/Nevada, 49 the Court
would be served by this instruction only in an ideal held that a state can regulate attorney speech under a
world with ideal jurors. The burden placed on the juror lesser standard of review than that reserved to the press
with this instruction is evident. Jurors are asked to and individuals, advocating a "substantial likelihood"
consider only evidence and argument introduced in the standard to protect a state's legitimate interest in guardcourtroom and to disregard what they have seen, heard, ing the integrity and fairness of the judiciary. 50 Addior read outside the courtroom. After repeated expo- tionally, this standard closely corresponds with the
sure, it is doubtful whether jurors can limit the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.
decisionmaking process solely to evidence presented at
ABA Model Rule3.6(a) prohibits an attorney from
trial. Even with a presumption of innocence jury making any "extrajudicial statement ... that will have
instruction, biases may be taken into the jury room and a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
resurface during deliberations.
adjudicative proceeding. "51 This provision is broadly
The Supreme Court has referred to an accused's interpreted to include statements relating to "the charright to a fair trial as the most fundamental of all acter, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
freedoms.42 It is this fundamental right that led the party, suspect ... or witness, the expected testimony of
Court to suggest that a state can restrict an attorney's a party or witness," ... the "possibility of a plea of
speech due to his unique role in the judicial process, guilty, ... the performance orresults ofany examination
even when the same restrictions would violate First or test, and . . . any opinion as to . . . guilt or
Amendment rights ifimposed upon the press or individ- innocence. "52 The rules specifically permit an attorney
to furnish only a description ofthe charges and defenses,
uals. 43
The central purpose of restricting an attorney's the schedule of proceedings, and the identity of the
25.2/ U. Bait. l.f. - g~
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defendant and the victim. 53 Additionally, Model Rule
3.8 requires prosecutors to exercise reasonable care to
ensure that law enforcement personnel do not make the
type of extrajudicial comments which they are prohibited from making under Model Rule 3.6.
The primary concern of Disciplinary Rule 7-107,
commonly referred to as the "no comment" rule, is to
curb an attorney's improper comments and not to
safeguard his free speech rights. 54 The Supreme Court
has endorsed the "substantial likelihood" standard and
the right to restrict an attorney's speech. 55 A violation
of the no comment rule could subject a lawyer to
disciplinary action, which can result in sanctions ranging from private reprimand to disbarment. A responsible attorney must recognize that extrajudicial statements can cause harm not only to the defendant, but also
to the attorney and the judicial process.
The disciplinary rules, standing alone, would serve
to protect fair trial rights from the prejudicial effect of
extrajudicial statements if lawyers exercised self-restraint or ifthe rules were strictly enforced. Complications would still exist, however, between the attorney's
constitutional right to speak outside the courtroom and
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
At best, restricting attorney speech under the rules
is problematic. The no comment rule and the Model
Rule on pre-trial publicity can be construed as prior
restraints on the speech ofattorneys because they enjoin
the lawyer's right to speak freely. The no comment rule
is content-based and ordinarily violative of the First
Amendment. Additionally, it has been argued that both
rules are either vague or overbroad and therefore
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. A rule
that a lawyer shall not comment on a pending case when
that comment threatens to prejudice a trial or the fair
administration of justice is vague because it does not
provide notice about what mayor may not be said. 56
Arguably, a rule that lawyers may not comment about
the character of a witness is overbroad because it
includes speech that often does not threaten the fairness
ofa trial. 57
The Model Rules and the Disciplinary Rules are in
place because the legal community saw a need to police
itself As a result, restrictions which do not apply to
either the public or the press are enforceable against
officers of the court. Both prosecutors and defense
attorneys have a duty to protect the interests of the
accused and the rights of the public. To engage in

conduct to the contrary is a violation of an ethical duty
and subject to sanctions. It is unethical for an officer of
the court to release inflammatory and prejudicial statements with the potential to violate the fair trial rights of
the defendant and seek refuge behind the First Amendment. Courts must prevent such incriminating statements before they are communicated.
Ethical restrictions are not the only means of regulating an attorney's public statements. Trial judges have
the power to inhibit or prevent media reporting and
access to the criminal process when they believe that
unrestricted public statements might prevent a fair trial.
The restraining order is a form ofregulation that enjoins
both the lawyer and the press from commenting publicly
on a pending case. Even if a fair trial can ultimately be
ensured through voir dire, disciplinary rules, or some
other device, there are serious costs to the judiciary
system. 58 The state has a substantial interest in preventing officers ofthe court from imposing such costs on the
judicial system and on the litigants. 59
The restraint of an attorney's speech, under the
Model Rules and Gentile, is narrowly tailored to achieve
these governmental objectives. The regulation ofspeech
is limited as it applies only to that speech that is
substantially likely to have a prejudicial effect; it is
neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all
attorneys participating in a pending case, and it merely
postpones the attorneys' comments until after the trial. 60
The First Amendment does not immunize trial
counsel from discipline for public statements which
might affect the fairness of a pending case. 61 When the
prosecutor speaks publicly about a pending criminal
case, he does so with a due process limitation that does
not constrain the press orthe public;62 he may not violate
the due process rights of the accused. 63 If the rights of
the accused are violated by the effects of the prosecutor's public comments about the case, the standard of
review is whether there is a substantial likelihood that
the statements will prejudice the adjudicative process. 64
At its best, the press has traditionally been regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal law field. 65 Its function is
documented by an impressive record of service over
several centuries. 66 The press does not simply publish
information about trials, but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and

criticism. 67 At its worst, a sensationalistic media can
substantially prejudice the fair trial rights of the defendant.
United States v. Simon,68 fully acknowledged that
the public has a First Amendment right of access to
judicial proceedings, while criticizing the press for
failing its duty to act responsibly when exercising this
right. The court in United States v. Abrahams69 did not
question the First Amendment rights of the press, even
though the exercise offree speech from the media made
it impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial
anywhere in Massachusetts, the rest ofNew England, or
the Northeastern section ofthe United States, including
New York, New Jersey or Pennsylvania. 70 Habitually,
the Supreme Court has been unwilling to place any
direct limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised
by the news media for "[w ]hat transpires in the court
room is public property."71
It has long been recognized that there is a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.72 On the other hand, Justice Black argued
forcefully in the dissenting opinion in Cox v. Louisiana73
that "[f]reedom of discussion should be given the
widest range compatible with the essential requirement
of the fair and orderly administration of justice, but it
must not be allowed to divert the trial from the very
purpose of a court system ... to adjudicate controversies in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom
according to legal procedures."74
The Sheppard v. Maxwell Court emphasized that
the trial court "should have made some effort to control
the release ofleads, information, and gossip to the press
... and recommended the gagging of trial participants
where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial
news ... will prevent a fair trial." The Supreme Court
has stressed that the cure lies in those remedial measures
that will prevent the prejudice at its inception75 and
emphasized the trial judge's "major responsibility for
acting to mitigate the effects of pre-trial publicity. "76
Courts upholding prior restraints have used the reasonable likelihood standard to evaluate whether the activity
restrained might result in an unfair trial. 77 Case law
suggests that judges take seriously the responsibility of
restraining trial participant's extrajudicial comments. 78
State appellate courts have encouraged trial courts to
use the publicity precautions set forth in Sheppard to
prevent the effects of intensive pre-trial publicity.79

Unfortunately, some courts still consider this remedy
extreme.
In Journal Newspapers Inc. v. State,80 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland vacated orders having the effect
ofenjoining certain classes of individuals from making
public comments about various aspects of the prosecution and restricting public access to certain documents
that were to become part ofthe proceedings. 81 The trial
judge recognized the competing interests and attempted to strike a fair balance, however, the appellate court
emphasized that the balance should have been struck
closer to the First Amendment than to the Sixth Amendment. 82
This ruling conformed to the 1976 Supreme Court
decision in Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart,83 wherein
the Court held that "prior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights."84 The test
laid out in Nebraska Press requires that before placing
a prior restraint on publications, a trial court must
examine "(a) the nature and extent of pre-trial news
publicity; (b) whether other measures would be likely to
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity;
and ( c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger. "85
Nebraska Press involved the constitutionality of a
gag order issued by the trial judge as the result of
widespread publicity. While the trial judge could
reasonably have assumed that the publicity reached
potential jurors, the Supreme Court found that he could
only speculate as to whether the jurors had a fixed
opinion making it impossible for them to decide the guilt
or innocence ofthe accused impartially.86 The restraining order, therefore, was defective because the state
court had failed to determine if other measures would
have mitigated the effects of the publicity.
While the Sheppard v. Maxwell Court focused on a
remedy that would prevent the prejudice at its inception
and endorsed the gag order for trial participants, Nebraska Press established that a prior restraint should be
the last remedy considered and not the first.

CONCLUSION
Courts must take such steps as are necessary by rule
and regulation that will protect the accused and the
judicial process from prejudicial outside interferences.
These same protective measures, however, may collide
with other constitutional rights of the accused and the
25.2/ U. l8a~L. L.f. - J'U
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speaker. Premature disclosure and weighing of the
evidence in the news media can seriously jeopardize a
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, and neither
the press nor the public has a right to be contemporaneously informed by the police, prosecuting attorney,
or informed police sources ofthe details ofthe evidence
being accumulated against the defendant. Trial courts
should take strong measures to ensure that the balance
is never weighed against the accused. While there is
nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events
that transpire in the courtroom, where there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial
will prevent a fair trial, a trial judge should employ any
effective remedy to minimize the prejudicial effect.
Trial by newspaper is unfortunate, but it is a reality.
Unless the courts accept the responsibility of restraining trial participants -- the most effective remedy to
curtail the effects ofextrajudicial statements -- the right
to a fair trial in the criminal justice system may well
prove impossible to protect. Inflammatory and prejudicial statements can and do influence the conduct and
behavior of the public and the trial participants.
All parties to the judicial process have a duty to
protect the constitutional rights of the accused and the
rights ofthe community. The press must recognize its
duty to act responsibly. Attorneys must recognize that
obedience to ethical rules may require abstention from
what, in other circumstances, might be constitutionally
protected speech. Finally, courts should sequester
juries and restrain trial participants when necessary to
prevent pre-trial publicity from prejudicing the fair trial
rights of the accused.
When the constitutional rights of two competing
interests collide, the court is faced with a difficult
decision in protecting one and abridging the other.
Both require protection because we all lose when the
constitutional rights of anyone individual are violated.
But most important are the fair trial rights of the
individual faced with the loss of life or liberty. When
life, liberty, reputation, and privacy are at stake, the
public's right to know should become secondary and
postponed, without challenge, until the completion of
the trial.
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